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Traveling in post-war Vietnam
One Tale Of Two Cities And Two NationsHe returns to many of the places of conflict and speaks with the people. His time in Vietnam and the relationships he had there had an enormous influence on him. His return seems to be a mix of catharthism and a quest for objective observation and curiosity. It should be up to a nation's own people to decide how to do things, but in one regard he could have been more critical and questioning of the policies of the post-1975 Vietnamese government. 100,000 people were sent to "re-education" prisons. Southern supporters and participants of the NVA (Viet-Cong) were forced out to be dominated by northerners: The communists were very repressive.
The title does make one wonder. "After the War Was Over," was written 14 years after the fall of Saigon. Another Vietnam "War" book? Not really, and that is good. It discusses the lives and conditions of those who participated in the drawn-out conflict from not just both, but the many sides that actually existed, and where these people are at today in their lives.
Some of the post-war communistic economic policies and later reforms were described, which are interesting. After the fall of Saigon in 1975, De Luan and the communists in Vietnam tried to collectivise agriculture. A proven disaster 50 years before in the Soviet Union, and then again in Maoist China. Collectivization was an outright failure in Vietnam as well. In addition to collectivization policies, the Northern Cadres forced the northern concept of central planning on the entrepreneurial South Vietnamese, which again, just simply doesn't work, being so contrary to human nature. It doesn't spur efficient production nor proper means of distribution of resources and goods. Did the Vietnamese communists learn anything? Yes, they did--after the fact. Now they claim to be the "first ones" to have departed (in 1986) from the moribund Soviet model. A patriotic communist Nguyen Van Linh, was reformist minded and his positions on policy within the government have labled him as the Vietnamese "Gorbachev." He had ideas that were considered by the post-75ers to be "right wing" or radical, but in the end he had their ear, showing some of the ways the South Vietnamese did things, which were objectively speaking, successful.
In this piece two cities are described, Hanoi and Saigon. Street addresses are mentioned and you can learn where significant happenings took place in both cities if you are going there. Many modern buildings, houses, and hotels are noted also. If someone is coming to Hanoi or Saigon, this book can be useful to learn about where things happened. I discovered that I work in the same building where the Pentagon press briefings called the "five o'clock follies" took place.
Some of Sheehan's coverage of Vietnamese history noted how the Vietnamese drove out the Mongols in the 13th Century, and have been invaded by the Chinese no less than 17 times prior to the 20th century. This book can be knocked off in a day.


An accurate description of one man's year in Vietnam
Review by named individual in book

It worksHowever, when I was dinning in a popular restaurant in a small town, the waitress didn't understand English, so this book helped me to know what to order (English translation of the menu is not enough, sometimes), and so on, even to ask for the bill.
You don't have to do any effort about the pronunciation, just show the phrase written in Thai to the other person.
It has also useful information for tourists, related to each of the topics the book is divided into (meals, transportation, etc.).
I missed it very much when I forgot it in the hotel and I had no way to tell to the taxi driver how to reach the place I wanted to. I had to wait 10 minutes to get a taxi with an English speaking driver.
Essential for beginners but not enough.

Disappointing
Authors' Affection Seen

For very specialized and advanced students only.
cambodian literary reader and glossary

Cooperation & Containment in Sino-Vietnamese RelationsChina and Vietnam had a complicated relationship long before the Indochina wars of the mid-20th century. According to Zhai, the Vietnamese "had a tradition of looking to China for models and inspirations," but there also were "historical animosities between the two countries as a result of China's interventions in Vietnam." Zhai writes that Mao Zedong was "eager to aid Ho Chi Minh in 1950" because Mao believed "Indochina constituted one of the three fronts (the others being Korea and Taiwan) that Mao perceived as vulnerable to an invasion by imperialist countries headed by the United States." When the Viet Minh army headed toward the decisive battle at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, they were accompanied by a Chinese "general military adviser," and China furnished the PAVN with antiaircraft guns, as well as engineering experts and large quantities of ammunition. The Viet Minh won the battle but were bitterly disappointed by the peace which followed. According to Zhai, China's approach to the Geneva conference was motivated by fear of the United States' designs in Indochina: "To prevent American intervention, [Zhou Enlai] was ready to compromise of the Laotian and Cambodian issue," and he formally proposed "withdrawal of the Viet Minh troops from Laos and Cambodia." Zhai writes: "For the Vietnamese Communists, the Geneva Conference served as a lesson about the nature and limits of Communist internationalism," and both Beijing and Moscow pressured the Viet Minh "to abandon its efforts to unify the whole of Vietnam."
Zhai makes the controversial assertion that, in 1961, President Kennedy "set out to increase U.S. commitment to the Saigon regime." In response, according to Zhai, Mao Zedong "expressed a general support for the armed struggle of the South Vietnamese people," but China's leaders "were uneasy about their Vietnamese comrades' tendency to conduct large-unit operations in the south." Zhai writes: "The period between 1961 and 1964 was a crucial one in the evolution of Sino-DRV relations....Its urgent need to resist American pressure increased its reliance on China's material assistance." According to Zhai: "The newly available Chinese documents clearly indicate that Beijing provided extensive support (short of volunteer pilots) to Hanoi during the Vietnam War and in doing so risked war with the United States." In Zhai's view, although Chinese leaders were "determined to avoid war with the United States," Beijing warned that "if the United States bombs China[,] that would mean war and there would be no limits to the war." According to Zhai: "Between 1965 and 1968, Beijing strongly opposed peace talks between Hanoi and Washington and rejected a number of international initiatives designed to promote a peaceful solution to the Vietnam conflict." "Above all, Mao and his associates wanted the North Vietnamese to wage a protracted war to tie down the United States in Vietnam." When the Paris negotiations began in May 1968, Beijing was "unenthusiastic." In less than three years, the international situation changed. Zhai's lengthy discussion of the complicated internal and international events leading up to the crisis in Cambodia in 1970 is a case study in Machiavellian politics and diplomacy. By 1971, according to Zhai, Chinese leaders were "keen to see an early conclusion of the Vietnam War in order to preserve American power and contain Soviet influence." After President Nixon's historic trip to China in 1972, according to Zhai, the North Vietnamese "drew a bitter lesson from Nixon's handshake with Mao that China's foreign policy was concerned less with Communist unity than with the pursuit of China's national interest." In Zhai';s view: "Nixon's decision to normalize relations with Beijing nullified the hitherto basic rationale of the Vietnam War, namely to contain and isolate Communist China." According to Zhai: "Mao and Zhou Enlai viewed with satisfaction the conclusion of the Paris Peace Agreement." In September 1975, just a few months after Saigon fell and Vietnam was unified, Zhai writes that Mao told a Vietnamese visitor, in effect, "Hanoi should stop looking to China for assistance." "The long historical conflict between China and Vietnam...had returned to life."
In conclusion, Zhai asserts that "[t]here were two strands in China's policy toward Vietnam during the two Indochina wars: cooperation and containment;" "From the 1950s to 1968, the cooperation side of China's policy was predominant; and "From the late 1960s, particularly between 1972 and 1975, the containment side of China's policy became more prominent." In my opinion, the most important aspects of this book is its demonstration that international Communism was not monolithic in the 1960s and 1970s. Zhai makes clear that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China encouraged and aided Vietnam's struggle for independence from France and its war for national unification against the United States, but the Communist powers were motivated more by national interests than by revolutionary solidarity. The history of Chinese-Vietnamese relations between 1950 and 1975 must be viewed within the broader contexts of growing Sino-Soviet competition for primacy in the international Communist movement and of China's eventual, if only limited, rapprochement with the United States. Zhai's book is, therefore, an important contribution to the literature about the most controversial foreign war in American history.
good summary but...

A worthwhile, flawed docu-drama
Gripping, impassioned narrative. New York Times

Nothing Spectacular.
A MUST BUY if traveling in and around Thailand!

Rough Guide better than Lonely Planet, FootprintThe Rough Guide is the best guidebook around for the country. It is superior to the Lonely Planet guide in the breadth and depth of coverage and especially its accuracy. I liked LP for other countries but here they did a very poor job.
I have not found even one instance where Lonely Planet provided information that Rough did not have. If you are traveling to the north, you may want to consider reading Footprint before you leave -- it has some interesting information.
Also, all hotels -- even the top ones -- can be negotiated down in price. Send them an e-mail and ask for special rates, corporate rates, etc. You can stay at the Metropole in Hanoi for less than half their rack rate.
Excellent coverage

a great companion for Holocaust literature
A great book